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ABSTRACT
The federal Constitution is ambiguous about federative power, Locke’s
description of the power over war and foreign relations. On the one hand, the
Constitution is plainly un-Lockean, dividing federative power between Congress and the
President and contemplating that they will share responsibility and exercise sometimes
competing prerogatives in war and foreign affairs. Yet there is a rich constitutional and
political history in America suggesting that the constitutional scheme is more Lockean
than at first blush, even if informal and hidden in complexity. This paper responds to two
distinct, but related, lines of argument that seek to limit especially the executive’s
Lockean tendencies regarding federative power: first, that courts should be more involved
in reviewing executive exercises of federative power; and second, that the current
administration has asserted an unprecedented view of executive authority that compels
judicial review as a crucial constitutional check. This paper offers a brief history of
judicial review relevant to federative power, recognizing three distinct eras of decisions
that have culminated in a prudently circumscribed approach to challenges regarding the
constitutional allocation of federative power that enforces the doctrines of nonjusticiability to avoid judicial intervention and permit play in the joints of the
Constitution’s formal federative power machinery. Still, the war on terror cases
foreshadow the possible coming of a new era in which political decisions regarding war
and foreign affairs will be subject to much more rigorous judicial scrutiny. This
judicialization of federative power, the paper contends, is an unwarranted and dangerous
step. Judicializing federative power would be consistent with the current Supreme
Court’s omnipotent posture toward judicial review generally, but would further
marginalize efforts at practical governance by political institutions and undermine the
formal constitutional arrangements that characterize their roles in war and foreign affairs.
Judicialization would also damage both the un-Lockean balance, which contemplates the
exercise of political tools by both Congress and the President when they are competing in
matters of war and foreign affairs, and the Lockean executive, who, Article II
contemplates, will act with energy to grapple with necessity and to affirmatively defend
the Constitution and the Republic.
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JUDICIALIZING FEDERATIVE POWER
By J. RICHARD BROUGHTON
I. INTRODUCTION

The intellectual origins of federative power account for the beguiling nature of,
and approach to, that subject in American constitutional law and history. Federative
power is Locke’s description of the state’s authority concerning “war and peace, leagues
and alliances,” or external affairs.1

Locke identified federative power alongside

executive power and legislative power, but placed federative power wholly in the hands
of the executive, or a single magistrate who would possess the executive power (which
was distinct in Locke’s formulation).2

He plainly understood the necessities which

marked the vicissitudes of foreign affairs, explaining that matters of war and peace could
not be directed by “antecedent, standing, positive laws” and must be dealt with through
the exercise of prudence and wise judgment.3 Despite Locke’s influence in the founding
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generation,4 it is notable that the Constitution does not adopt his taxonomy. Rather, the
Constitution’s allocation of power more closely resembles that of Montesquieu, whose
understanding of separated and divided powers serves as the fundamental structure for
our constitutional scheme.5

In this sense, it can be said that we have a kind of

intellectually Lockean constitution that is moderated (and much improved) by
Montesquieu’s formal separation of powers.
Montesquieu identified the executive and legislative powers, but adds a third
distinct power, the power of judging.6 The federative power, however, disappears as a
distinct power in Montesquieu, for he joins domestic and foreign affairs power in the
unity of an executive, and gives independence to the judicial power (which he constitutes
with juries of the defendant’s peers; Locke acknowledged the judicial power but placed
judicial power in the legislature).7 In Book XI of The Spirit of the Laws, when he
introduces the judicial power, Montesquieu says that liberty in a citizen is “that
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security.”8
Perhaps, then, it is no accident that federative power is not expressly and distinctly
revealed in Montesquieu’s allocation of powers. As Roger Barrus has suggested, perhaps
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Montesquieu sensed something dangerous about federative power (at least as Locke had
described it) and thus needed to obscure that power in order to give citizens a greater
sense of security about their freedom.9
In light of these different approaches by two thinkers of significant repute and
distinction among the Framers, it is important to ask whether the federal Constitution is
intentionally ambiguous about federative power. And when we talk about federative
power and the Constitution, it stands to reason that our focus is predominantly upon the
distribution of that power among the political branches of our Government. The Framers
explicitly rejected Locke’s formal allocation of federative power by, instead, distributing
powers of war and foreign affairs in both the Congress and the President: the President
serves as commander-in-chief, has the power to make treaties, and can appoint
ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and other officers to assist him in carrying out foreign
policy;10 Congress has the power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,
make rules for the armed forces, and provide funding for the military and military
operations.11
9
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But though the Constitution’s formal division of power appears to be more
Montesquieu than Locke, and though the federative power (while less obscure than in
Montesquieu) remains at least ambiguous, the Framers did not entirely agree upon the
scope of the powers over war and peace that had been assigned to the two political
branches. And there was some sympathy for at least the theoretical basis for Locke’s
federative regime.

Publius, after explaining in Federalist #70 that energy in the

executive is essential to good government,12 reminds us in Federalist #74 that
Commander-in-Chief power should obviously belong to the executive because “[o]f all
the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”13 In the same
paragraph, Publius also explains that evidence of the general acceptance of this notion
comes from the State Constitutions14 – he is right. During the Revolutionary period,
virtually all of the State Constitutions placed war-making authority in executive hands,
while giving their legislatures control over the state treasuries; only South Carolina’s
Constitution placed war-making authority in the legislative branch.15

And even though

the Constitution grants Congress the power to “declare war,” the Constitutional
Convention, like the antecedent State Constitutions, distinguished “declaring war” from
Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 693 (1990); Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984). I confess I am persuaded by Professor John Yoo’s recent work on
this subject, The Powers of War and Peace, in which he (properly, I think) describes the Constitution’s
vision of a federative power centralized in an energetic executive, checked by a Congress with distinct
powers of funding, declaration, and general legislation. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE
(2005). That agreement is reflected elsewhere in this article.
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“making war.”16 As John Yoo explains, the primary authorities on war and treaties at the
time of the Framing – Grotius, Vattel, and even Blackstone – did not contend that
declarations of war were necessary to initiate hostilities; such declarations, rather, served
as legal notice to the enemy and to the citizenry that state of war existed.17
Later, the dispute over who holds primacy in exercising federative power was best
captured in Hamilton and Madison’s Helevidius/Pacificus debate concerning President
Washington’s proclamation of neutrality in the war between England and France.
Pacificus, Hamilton’s pseudonym, comes closest to the Lockean vision of an executive
magistrate holding the federative power.18 In foreign relations, Pacificus contends, the
executive’s power is best capable of responding to the necessities of international
intercourse and, moreover, it is whole – as Harvey Mansfield explains, “it acts for a
whole in relation to other wholes;”19 while the Constitution admits of exceptions, those
exceptions are (and must be construed as) narrow.20 Pacificus wants to ensure the
preservation of the executive’s constitutional prerogatives – among those is to preserve
the Union – and that each branch is capable of performing its particular functions.21 The
debate is notable not merely for its content, but also for Hamilton’s singular place in the
Founding era and his influence in the development of presidential power. As Karl
16

See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 318-19 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966).
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Walling explains, President Washington needed a voice, a rhetorical defense of his
administration, and that voice was Hamilton.22 Thus if we want to understand the origins
and development of the American executive we must understand Hamilton, and
Hamilton’s Pacificus offers a quintessentially robust perspective on the executive’s
federative powers in the American constitutional scheme. One senses that as Pacificus,
Hamilton’s conception of the federative power seeks to embrace the structural and
institutional design of Article II while retaining a kind of Machiavellian authority to meet
necessity.23

In this sense, perhaps Hamilton embraces a larger purpose of the

Constitution, to unit stability and adaptability.
Consequently, Locke’s vision of a single magistrate with authority to direct
foreign relations through acts of prudence that were not amenable to the precise
directives of positive law, finds expression in American constitutional history, theory,
and practice, even if not in its purest form. In this sense, we have both an un-Lockean
Constitution of federative power – one in which federative power is divided between the
legislature and executive, contemplating that they will share responsibility and exercise
22

Karl Walling, Remarks at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Panel on
“Federative Power and the Constitution” (Sept. 2, 2006).
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“reflecting deep animosity” and “[i]]n prose more pedestrian than Hamilton’s.” Id. at 443. Of course,
Hamilton had a flair not only for offering persuasive rhetorical defenses of expansive executive power, but
also for defending expansive federal powers, more generally. This is evident in his defense of a national
bank. See id. at 353-54. Many of Hamilton’s arguments for the bank, which he viewed as crucial to his
early economic and fiscal programs, were echoed by Daniel Webster when Webster argued McCulloch v.
Maryland in the Supreme Court. Id. at 355. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch reads, in many
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(1819).
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sometimes competing prerogatives in war and foreign affairs – and a less noticeable
Lockean executive, who, though obscured by the complexities of the un-Lockean
scheme, will act with energy (and the ingredients that characterize it) to grapple with
necessity and to affirmatively defend the Constitution and the Republic. The Lockean
traits of the executive are formal, then, but nuanced.
This background is relevant because it provides the context for what may seem an
unremarkable proposition: in viewing the allocation of federative power in the
Constitution, whether we agree as a normative matter with the distribution that the
Constitution contains, overwhelming focus of the academic literature is upon the
Congress and the President; it is clear that one branch is largely left out of the dialogue –
the judiciary. Article III establishes an independent judiciary with, as Publius described
it, neither the power of the sword nor the purse.24

Yet as unremarkable as this

proposition may be, it, too, possesses a degree of nuance and complexity when we
consider the appropriate role for the courts in a democratic republic. And just as it has
done in a variety of areas of domestic policy, the judiciary is now poised to exert
tremendous influence over American foreign policy and war-time decision-making.
I have written elsewhere of the historical treatment of war powers cases in the
American courts, before September 11, 2001.25 But a new evaluation is warranted. This
paper is therefore a reaction and response to two distinct critiques: first, the more general
theoretical assertion of several prominent legal scholars like John Ely, Louis Henkin,
Harold Koh, and Thomas Franck, who have argued that courts should be more involved
24

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).

25

See J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
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in assessing the actions of politicians (particularly the President) with regard to federative
powers26 (Professor Franck has been most forceful, arguing that the rule of law requires
courts to actively conduct judicial review of foreign affairs cases, recognizing no judicial
difference between foreign and domestic affairs);27 and second, the more specific
contemporary argument that because, through a variety of foreign policy decisions,
President Bush has asserted an unprecedented vision for executive authority, the White
House’s existing legal position compels judicial review as a crucial check on the
Presidency.28 This paper contends that an increasingly judicialized federative power is an
unwelcome step toward dismantling the important distinction between domestic affairs
and foreign affairs, the latter being marked by a harsh form of necessity that requires

26

See ELY, supra note 11, at 54-60; LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); KOH, supra note 11, at 134-49; THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS,
JUDICIAL ANSWERS 8-9 (1992).
See also FISHER, supra note 11, at 197-99 (urging lawmakers not to try to compel court action);
Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REV.
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disputes).
27
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powers); Senator Dianne Feinstein, Remarks before the Queen’s Bench Bar Association (May 29, 2006),
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expansion of power under this President” and referring to “new legal theories” being advocated by the
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Cf. The Honorable Gerald E. Rosen, The War on Terrorism in the Courts, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L.,
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unique criteria for political action. Moreover, I argue, judicializing federative power
marginalizes political institutions and the formal constitutional arrangements that
characterize their roles in foreign affairs.29

II. WAR POWERS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW,
A BRIEF BUT (IMPERFECTLY) ORGANIZED HISTORY
While it is true that the judicial power extends to cases involving U.S. laws and
treaties, and affecting ambassadors, and other public ministers and consuls,30 historically
American courts understood that questions touching upon war and foreign relations
involved a different set of criteria, criteria that did not lend themselves easily to
adjudication, particularly constitutional adjudication.

Consequently, throughout our

history, although American jurisprudence certainly has seen adjudication of cases
touching upon international affairs and American foreign policy, courts have been more
reluctant to involve themselves in questions about the proper allocation of constitutional
war powers.31
Over the past four decades, that reluctance has been manifest in the judiciary’s
application of the doctrines of justiciability – standing, ripeness, mootness, and the
prohibition on advisory opinions, all of which are crucial to the formal separation of
powers because their application deprives courts of the power to act – and the political
29

In offering this view I want to be clear that when I speak of judicializing federative power, I am
for purposes of this project focusing my contentions on cases involving war powers specifically, rather than
the entire realm of foreign relations cases that could arise in the civil and criminal justice systems and
implicate judicial review (such as treaties and congressional-executive agreements), although some of the
same arguments could obtain with regard to other areas of federative power.

30

See U.S. CONST. art III.
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See Broughton, War Power, supra note 25, at 693-713; FRANCK, supra note 26, at 61-76.
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question doctrine (both in its constitutional state, and its prudential state, either of which
also serves a critical function in circumscribing the power of courts).
I therefore identify three general eras of judicial treatment of cases relevant to
constitutionally-proscribed war power: the developmental era, in which we see the
judiciary beginning to develop its own sense of how it will approach the judicial role,
from the days of the early Supreme Court through the Civil War and the Court’s decision
in the Prize Cases;32 the definitional era, which is marked primarily by the Court’s
decisions in United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.33 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,34 in which the Court took bolder steps in attempting to define the nature of
constitutional powers, and their limits as applied in foreign affairs; and the nonjusticiability era, in which the courts were routinely called upon to determine whether
particular executive actions violated the constitutional allocation of war powers,
particularly in light of the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973,35 but where
courts regularly used the doctrines of non-justiciability to avoid resolving those claims. I
then suggest that, after the Supreme Court’s recent war on terror decisions, there is reason
to believe that we may be entering a new era in which the courts will judicialize – or play
a more active role in policing – political exercises of federative power (and particularly
those originating in the executive). I confess that the paucity of judicial review in the war
powers arena, particularly in the Nation’s early years, makes this taxonomy imperfect

32

67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).

33

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2005).
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and, frankly, awkward. But my desire is to give some historical context and continuity to
the prevailing, though now compromised, view of the judicial role in these types of cases.

A. The Developmental Era
Within the developmental era, some scholars place great emphasis on early cases
like Bas v. Tingy,36 Talbot v. Seeman,37 and Little v. Barreme,38 all of which placed the
Supreme Court in the middle of controversies arising from the American seizure of
foreign ships in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s. A few scholars contend that these cases
provide the earliest affirmation of the judicial role in refereeing disputes over the power
to wage war and make foreign policy.39 When viewed this way, at a high level of
abstraction, it is undeniable that these are significant cases. But viewing them at this
level of generality leads one to somewhat overstate their significance. Viewed with a
greater degree of circumspection, these early cases merely concerned the domestic and
legal effects of existing war, and the rights of individuals as implicated in private lawsuits
arising from war-time political action; none of them involved constitutional questions
about the allocation or distribution of federative power.40 They were, rather, modest
forays into the realm of international relations that involved the interpretation and

36

4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).

37

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).

38

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).

39

See, e.g., ELY, supra note 11, at 55 (explaining that Little is an example of judicial review of war
powers controversies); Corn, supra note 26, at 210 (arguing that the Qasi-War cases offer historical
evidence that courts can be involved in adjudicating war powers disputes).
40

See Yoo, Politics by Other Means, supra note 11, at 293.
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application of federal statutes; they did not set a precedent for more expansive judicial
review of inter-branch disputes concerning the exercise of federative power.
Indeed, often overlooked are other early cases that set precedents for a more
circumscribed judicial power.41 The origin of the Court’s doctrine on advisory opinions
(a doctrine that serves as an important structural basis for other limits on judicial power,
such as the adequate and independent state ground doctrine) emerged from a famous
early controversy over federative power: the question of neutrality in the war between
England and France. This, of course was the occasion for Pacificus and Helvedius’s
commentary on the nature and scope of constitutional federative power, but we often
forget that Secretary of State Jefferson had asked the Supreme Court to intervene by
answering a series of questions concerning President Washington’s power to proclaim
American neutrality.42 Chief Justice Jay sent a letter back to Jefferson, stating that the
Court refused to enter the dispute, citing the Constitution’s formal separation of powers
and the formal role of courts, and saying that the Court would not “extra-judicially”
decide upon Jefferson’s questions.43
Even Marbury v. Madison,44 though not a case about federative power
specifically, is instructive, for Marbury provides the doctrinal origin of the political

41

See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) (deferring to
political branches in controversy concerning America’s alleged violation of treat with France when it
seized ship near Haiti).
See also Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An
Empirical Study of the Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855 (2005).

42

See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 25 (1993).

43

See Correspondence of the Justices, Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices
to President Washington, Aug. 8, 1793, in JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1505 (9th ed.
2001).
44

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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question doctrine.45

Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall’s Marbury opinion specifically

identifies federative power as an area in which the judiciary should avoid interfering with
discretionary acts of the President.46 As we will see when we consider the contemporary
cases, the political question doctrine plays (as it ought to) a critical role in determining
whether judicial review is appropriate as to a particular question of constitutional war
power.47
Consider also the Supreme Court’s divided decision in The Prize Cases,48 which
marks the outer boundary of the developmental era, and in which the Court upheld
President Lincoln’s order to block southern ports during the Civil War. Again, the Court
does not enter the thicket of determining the existence of a war or defining the boundaries
of presidential versus congressional action, although this was the first, and perhaps last,
case to articulate in a formal holding the nature of presidential war power. Justice Grier’s
opinion made explicit its deference to the President, recognizing that the level of force to
be employed while acting as Commander-in-Chief is a determination that only the
President can make.49 “Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in45

Id. at 169-70 (“The province of this court is . . . not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, can never be
made in this court.”).

46

Id. at 166.

47

See infra, Section II.C; see also Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941, 946-50 (2004) (discussing application of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases, from
Marbury to the modern era); Abner J. Mikva, The Political Question Revisited: War Powers and the “Zone
of Twilight,” 76 KY. L.J. 329, 336 (1987) (stating “[o]ver the years, the political question doctrine has had
particular resiliency in cases involving foreign policy”); but cf. FRANCK, supra note 26, at 31-44
(discussing, and questioning, the development of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases).
For an excellent discussion of the doctrine beyond the foreign affairs realm, see Rachel Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).
48

67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).

49

Id. at 670.
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Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord them the character of
belligerents,” the opinion explained, “is a question to be decided by him, and this court
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government
to which this power was entrusted.”50 The Prize Cases thus provide perhaps the most
useful paradigm from this era for judicial deference, as opposed to abstention, in war
powers controversies.

B. The Definitional Era
The next era – the definitional era – comes in the twentieth century, where two
cases stand out above all others for their influence in determining the nature and scope of
constitutional federative powers, although neither case, properly understood, involved the
actual adjudication of a constitutional question about the scope of federative power
specifically. Indeed, the most famous portions of each case were not, strictly speaking,
binding judicial authority: in Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland’s notorious discussion
of executive supremacy in foreign affairs; and in Youngstown, the Steel Seizure Case,
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion establishing what has been adopted as the operative
modern constitutional taxonomy of executive power vis-a-vis the Congress.
In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland, borrowing from an early speech by John
Marshall and from Pacificus’s description of the executive,51 stated that the president is
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Id.
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10 ANNALS OF CONG. 163 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall); Hamilton, supra note 20, at 54
(describing the executive as the “organ of intercourse between the nation and other nations”); see also
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999)
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the “sole organ of the United States in the field of international relations.”52 He also
drew the critical distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, and stated that “the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as representative of the nation.”53
Scholars have, quite properly, noted some of the flaws in Justice Sutherland’s CurtissWright opinion, notably his failure to account for congressional foreign relations powers
granted specifically by the Constitution and for his discussion of the nature and scope of
executive powers over international affairs, despite the fact that this discussion was
unnecessary to the Court’s resolution of the precise issue in that case, that Congress could
constitutionally delegate power to the president to halt arms sales to warring nations in
South America.54 Sutherland’s dicta, however, has proven remarkably resilient despite
the scholarly criticism, and is frequently cited by those defenders of a more purely
Lockean version of distributing federative power.55

Indeed, Curtiss-Wright stands

alongside Hamilton’s Pacificus essays as an example of the appeal of Lockean federative
power theory to the practice of governance in American history.

(writing that Curtiss-Wright’s plenary executive powers dicta is grounded in late-19th Century
jurisprudence of inherent plenary powers).
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299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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See id.
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See FISHER, supra note 11, at 57, 61; FRANCK, supra note 26, at 15; KOH, supra note 11, at 94.
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See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); see also American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 415 (2003) (citing Curtiss-Wright with approval); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 n. 17 (1981)
(distinguishing the issue from the one in Curtiss-Wright).
For a good discussion of Curtiss-Wright’s historical significance in reshaping foreign affairs law,
see G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1999).
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Moreover, as significant as the Steel Seizure Case has become to assessing
separation of powers problems (and Justice Jackson’s opinion, though it did not garner a
majority of votes, has emerged over time as the dominant rule in this area, as reflected by
the Court’s decision in, for example, Dames & Moore v. Regan56), it is important to recall
that Youngstown did not involve federative power, per se, nor is its rule, or Justice
Jackson’s taxonomy, limited to foreign affairs problems. Nor does Justice Jackson’s
approach suggest that courts should offer aggressive judicial review even where his
categories of power are implicated; rather, Justice Jackson concedes that Congress should
use its own institutional tools and political self-help rather than expect assistance from
the federal judiciary.57 In fact, during this same era, Justice Jackson wrote in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the
political departments of Government, Executive and Legislative. They are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only b those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power and
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.58
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown, then, provide competing definitions of constitutional
federative power: whereas Curtiss-Wright defines federative power as implicating
national sovereignty and centralized in the executive (per Locke), Youngstown can be
56

453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War, Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Prof. Robert Turner) (stating that both the Jackson concurrence
and majority opinion “emphasize that they were not endeavoring to constrain the powers of the President in
dealing with the external world).
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333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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applied to limit executive flexibility to deal with the necessities of the international arena.
Yet neither case tells us precisely how active the judicial role should be in policing
exercises of constitutional war power. Moreover, Justice Jackson’s opinion in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines provides at least a theoretical basis for either judicial abstention or at
least for the kind of deference we see in The Prize Cases.

So while this era gives us

some definition (albeit conflicting ones) of the nature of constitutional powers, it
provides only ambiguous guidance as to the scope of judicial power to resolve
controversies about the allocation of constitutional war and foreign affairs powers.59

C. The Non-Justiciability Era
Thus far, our focus has been upon the Supreme Court. By the 1960s, though,
armed with the Youngstown precedent, litigants began asking lower courts to decide
explicitly whether presidential action had violated the constitutional allocation of
federative powers. In addition, a statutory challenge (or, as it became, a constitutional
challenge with a statutory overlay) became more palatable, after Congress enacted the
War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto in 1973.60 By this time, however,
the Court has also decided Baker v. Carr,61 which established the modern framework for
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That ambiguity is reinforced if we look at the Court’s approach in another opinion from this era
written by Justice Jackson, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 399 U.S. 763 (1950). Eisentrager held that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition filed by German prisoners held in occupied Germany by
American forces. Justice Jackson’s opinion there is littered with language of deference to political
authorities managing war. Id. at 779. Both the formal holding, and underlying rationale, of Eisentrager,
however, have been undermined by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See Standards for Military
Commissions, Hearing before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Theodore B. Olson) (criticizing Rasul’s treatment of Eisentrager).
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50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. (2005); see also 1973 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 893
(describing President Nixon’s constitutionally-based veto).
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369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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applying the political question doctrine. Consequently, despite the appearance that
Youngstown provided all of the analysis necessary to judge whether a presidential act of
war-making violated the Constitution’s distribution of powers, lower courts beginning in
the 1960s refused to become entangled in the hotly-debated question of whether a
particular presidential decision of war was unconstitutional.62 The primary point of
departure here is the Vietnam War, and especially President Nixon’s orders related to the
bombing in Cambodia, which were the subject of many lawsuits in the lower federal
courts challenging the president’s authority to initiate hostilities in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war, but the legal basis for the litigation was adopted with
regard to subsequent military operations in the 1980s and 1990s.63 No court ever ruled
upon the constitutionality of presidential war-making in these cases. Instead, the lower
courts used the political question doctrine, and the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
mootness, to dispose of these cases.
In Orlando v. Laird, Massachusetts v. Laird, and Mitchell v. Laird, for example,
courts applied various forms of the political question doctrine to avoid ruling on the
merits of servicemembers’s constitutional challenges to presidential initiation and
conduct of hostilities in Vietnam.64 Similarly, in DaCosta v. Laird, the Second Circuit
applied the doctrine where an Army Specialist stationed in Vietnam questioned whether
the President could order mining of Vietnamese ports and harbors.65
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See Broughton, War Power, supra note 25, at 701-04.
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See id. at 701-07.
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Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d. Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.
1971); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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continued in the 1980s and 1990s, where lower courts used the justiciability doctrines to
turn away challenges under Article I and the War Powers Resolution to presidential
decisions to involve the U.S. in hostilities in El Salvador and Nicaragua (under President
Reagan),66 the Persian Gulf (under President Reagan and the first President Bush),67 and
Kosovo (under President Clinton).68

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Campbell v.

Clinton,69 which challenged President Clinton’s use of airstrikes in Kosovo, also provides
a particularly useful discussion between Judges Silberman and Tatel concerning
justiciability in war powers cases. Judge Silberman espoused a robust political question
doctrine, while Judge Tatel was less sanguine about the doctrine, acknowledging a role
for the courts in war powers questions.70
Most recently, the First Circuit used the ripeness doctrine to reject a challenge –
brought by servicemembers, their families, and various Members of Congress – to
President Bush’s use of military force in Iraq.71 Although the court acknowledged that
the political question doctrine is “famously murky” and that its reliance on that doctrine
has been historically “sparing,” it nonetheless concluded that ripeness afforded the
clearest and most principled basis for disposing of the lawsuit.72 Congress could take
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See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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See Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141
(D.D.C. 1990); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 D.D.C. 1990)
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See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Id; see also Broughton, War Power, supra note 25, at 707-13 (analyzing Campbell).
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Compare Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring), with id. at 37-40 (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
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Id. at 140.
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some immediate action that would affect troop deployment, the Iraqis could act in a
manner that would avert further hostilities, investigations by weapons inspectors
continued in Iraq – a number of contingencies remained that made the suit premature.73
In addition, although not strictly a war powers case, the District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected a challenge to President Bush’s unilateral withdrawal from the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty.74 In this suit, brought exclusively by Members of the House of
Representatives (led by Representative Dennis Kucinich, an Ohio Democrat), the court
disposed of the matter on both standing and political question grounds.75
Although most of the action during this era occurred in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court, too, articulated a relatively robust political question doctrine for foreign
affairs. First, in Gilligan v. Morgan,76 a case arising out of the tragedy at Kent State
University, the Court refused to order federal court supervision of National Guard troops,
holding instead that making rules for training and discipline of the militia was a power
committed exclusively to the Congress under Article I, section 8. And again, a fourJustice plurality invoked the doctrine in Goldwater v. Carter,77 which, although not a war
powers case (it concerned President Carter’s unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense
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Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).

75
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Treaty with Taiwan), provides a useful discussion of federative power distribution,
particularly in light of the Curtiss-Wright dicta.78
This era thus demonstrates that, although armed with precedent for upsetting
presidential war-time decision making on constitutional grounds, the courts
acknowledged a prudential sensitivity to their institutional own limits, and helped to
effectuate the Constitution’s vision of give-and-take, and self-help, among the political
branches in exercising foreign affairs power.79

D. An Emerging Era of Judicialization?
With respect to questions about the constitutional allocation of powers in war
powers cases, the model developed in what I have termed the non-justiciability era – in
which the doctrines of justiciability, complemented by a prudential sensitivity about the
uniqueness of such matters that required judicial deference – still, presumably applies.
But model is confounded (or at least potentially so) by the Supreme Court’s recent war
on terrorism cases.
Three cases are noteworthy in this respect: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,80 which rejected
the kind of broad, pro-executive view of constitutional war and foreign affairs powers
that has its philosophical origins in Locke, and later in Pacificus and Marshall, and which
78

Id. at 1004-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).

79

See Broughton, War Power, supra note 25, at 719-24; see also Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That
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(1997) (explaining that “there are various procedural and jurisdictional obstacles to litigating over war and
foreign affairs); Sidak, supra note 11, at 114-15 (explaining that even if war powers disputes are justiciable,
courts will have difficulty framing a remedy and can use the doctrines of ripeness and mootness to
foreclose judicial review); Mikva, supra note 47, at 339 (stating that “if a court wishes to avoid deciding a
war powers question, it has the doctrinal tools to do so.”).
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made clear that judicial review in the foreign policy arena would not be circumscribed
when the litigation implicates individual rights of an American citizen; Rasul v. Bush,81
which held that even non-citizen enemy combatants held outside the jurisdiction of the
United States could have the privilege of seeking habeas corpus relief from their
detention; and, most recently, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,82 which once again rejected broad
assertions of presidential war power and which appears to sanction a judicial approach
that places the Court now firmly in the business of judging and adjudicating the details of
presidential (or even congressional) decisions regarding war policy. Indeed, the Court
now seems to be laying the foundation for a continuing judicial policy of micromanaging
war-time decision making by the political branches.
Hamdi and Hamdan are particularly worthy of discussion here, for in each case
the Court articulates not simply a role for the judiciary in these matters, but an
aggressive, non-deferential, interventionist role. In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor wholly
rejects the Government’s position that the courts lack the institutional competence to
supervise the executive’s military decision-making and that the separation of powers
mandates a circumscribed role for the courts here.83 Although she concedes that she does
not address directly the broader question concerning the Court’s role in war powers
controversies more generally,84 Justice O’Connor makes clear that when executive warmaking implicates individual rights, the Constitution envisions a role for all three
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branches.85

Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s opinion suggests that the result of a more

deferential judicial model would be the condensing of power into a single branch.86 Still,
despite the lack of deference and the Court’s aggressive application of due process
balancing to the detention of citizen combatants, the plurality is careful to insist that the
political branches retain sufficient flexibility to craft procedures that would satisfy
Hamdi’s due process rights.87
Apparently, though, this kind of flexibility still remains subject to the Court’s
omnipresent watchful eye, as Hamdan illustrates. In the complicated Hamdan decision,
a Court majority endorsed three major holdings: that, notwithstanding Congress’s attempt
in the Detainee Treatment Act to foreclose habeas relief for Guantanamo Bay detainees,
courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions that were filed before the DTA’s effective
date;88 that the military commission structure is inconsistent with the UCMJ;89 and that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict with al Qaeda.90
Notable in Hamdan is the some of the language the Court uses in questioning the
existence of military necessity.91 And the majority – neither in Justice Stevens’ opinion
nor in the separate opinions by Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer – makes no meaningful
effort (unlike the plurality in Hamdi) to reassure us of the Court’s sensitivity to the limits
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on its role generally, and particularly in cases involving war powers and foreign affairs.92
Rather, Hamdan subjects the President’s contentions to exacting scrutiny, giving no
deference whatsoever: it resolves any uncertainty about the DTA against the President;93
it assumes that the congressional authorization was not specific enough to justify
Hamdan’s military commissions;94 Justice Stevens even endorses the proposition that
Hamdan cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy.95 The Court’s review in Hamdan looks
resembles its application of strict scrutiny in some areas of constitutional law, in which it
presumes the unconstitutionality of a law and places the burden on the Government to
justify the law by demonstrating that it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest.96

Of course, strict scrutiny is ordinarily an element of

constitutional adjudication, and Hamdan is not a constitutional case; but the aggressive
review here, and the lack of deference, suggests that the comparison is a fitting one. No
one reasonably expected the Court to defer to presidential prerogatives in the manner of
Curtiss-Wright, but the regime of judicial review that Hamdan represents is far from the
carefully circumscribed view of the judge’s role that Justice Jackson articulated in
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Chicago & Southern Air Lines, and arguably goes beyond the modest role that Justice
O’Connor endorsed in Hamdi, which by its terms extended judicial protection during a
state of war only to American citizens.97
Importantly, neither Hamdi nor Hamdan express a view about the proper
allocation of constitutional war power; Hamdan, in fact, issues no constitutional rulings
at all (Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence, however, refers to Youngstown and says
that this is a case where the President’s authority is at its lowest ebb under Justice
Jackson’s taxonomy).98 And in both Hamdi and Hamdan, the Court expressly avoids the
more difficult constitutional war powers problem of whether the presidential actions were
justified by inherent authority under Article II, because Congress here had authorized the
actions.99 Moreover, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Rasul all involved habeas litigation, which by
definition requires the involvement and review of courts.

It is worth considering,

however, how the Court would react if Congress had not authorized the actions (a
problem the Court would have had to confront in Hamdi had it answered the first
question presented differently), or if the questions presented occurred outside the habeas
context. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario (it has happened, consider the previous
subsection) in which a president of one party engages in military decision-making
pursuant to his Article II powers with which a Congress of another party takes issue,
prompting litigation.

The 110th Congress, in fact, offers another such possibility:

emboldened by a new Democratic majority in each house of Congress, and increasing
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unpopularity of the War in Iraq, the 110th has already seen the introduction of legislation
(though some of it in the form of non-binding resolutions) and legislative hearings in
which members have questioned an increase in American troop strength and
contemplated their own authority to bound President Bush’s conduct of the war.100
More could be said about these decisions, Hamdan in particular, but it is not my
project here to provide a comprehensive comment upon the cases; others have done so,
and better than could I.101 Rather than belabor the details further in this subsection, I
prefer to make an observation concerning Justice Thomas that has gone mostly unnoticed
in the recent commentary concerning the Court’s war on terror decisions.
Justice Thomas was alone in dissent in Hamdi (Justices Scalia and Stevens also
dissented, but on grounds that the Government should have prosecuted Hamdi for treason
or suspended the writ of habeas corpus),102 and a dissenter in Hamdan and Rasul. He
wrote separately in Hamdi and Hamdan, speaking exclusively for himself in Hamdi, and
joined only in part by Justices Scalia and Alito in Hamdan.103 Through these decisions, it
appears as though Justice Thomas has now emerged as the only member of the Court to
100
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fully embrace a robust regime of judicial deference in cases implicating presidential
exercises of war power. His constant citation to The Prize Cases is evidence of this.104
He also appears, though not quite as directly as even he might prefer, to champion a
robust executive role in exercising federative power, in addition to a highly deferential
judicial model for foreign affairs cases. As he explained in Hamdi, “Congress, to be sure,
has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and national security. But it is
crucial to recognize that judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of
vesting primary responsibility in a unitary executive.”105 Turning the tables on those who
rely upon Justice Jackson’s Youngstown opinion, Justice Thomas cites Justice Jackson’s
opinion in Chicago & Southern Air Lines (“the very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of Government, Executive and Legislative,”
Justice Thomas reminds us).106 Justice Thomas’s vision of federative power, then, looks
downright Hamiltonian, even Lockean, and sets him apart from each of his colleagues on
the Court.107
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III. AGAINST JUDICIALIZATION

Having described the historical treatment of foreign affairs in the courts, and the
recent trend toward more aggressive judicial review of presidential war-making
decisions, a few normative observations are in order. These observations relate not
simply to the Court’s treatment of foreign affairs, but, more broadly, to its own
understanding of its role as an institution in the constitutional design.
My contention is not simply that courts should be more deferential, or, in some
instances, entirely uninvolved, in many of these cases, although I adhere to these notions.
Scholars like Rachel Barkow108 and Jide Nzelibe,109 have persuasively advocated a robust
political question doctrine and doctrines of deference that ensure the courts will only
exercise their ability to act in cases where they are specifically empowered, or otherwise
competent, to do so. And in response to those who contend that these cases are within
the judicial ken because “this is what judges do,” (consider Judge Tatel’s concurring
opinion in Campbell) those like Justice Thomas respond with a compelling assertion
grounded in sensible notions of institutional competence: unlike many cases involving
domestic affairs, judges lack sufficient competence, expertise, and facilities to delve too
deeply into war powers problems.110
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doctrine, notably Professor Franck, who argue that the political question approach
undermines the rule of law which demands a role for judges in addressing constitutional
questions related to the allocation of war and foreign affairs powers, must face
“insuperable

obstacles,”

as

Professor

Nzelibe

has

explained;111

incompatibility with constitutional text, structure, and history.

notably,

its

Courts are not the

exclusive interpreters of the Constitution; indeed, as Hamilton, Madison and Marshall
explained in the early years of the Republic after Ratification,112 the political branches
play an important role in constitutional deliberation and interpretation,113 and there are
multiple provisions of the Constitution that are not amenable to constitutional
adjudication in the courts (for example, a congressional determination as to what
constitutes a “high crime or misdemeanor” under Article II, section 4, or whether the
President has properly exercised veto powers under Article I, section 7).114 Moreover, in
addition to the historical constitutional practice of judicial non-intervention in war
powers controversies and the Constitution’s structural design for allowing the Congress
111
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and President to engage in their own constitutional deliberation on the scope and nature
of their respective war powers, we can point to the Constitutional Convention, at which
Madison argued that the judicial power should extend only to cases of a “Judiciary
Nature,”115 and at which the Framers explicitly rejected a proposed Council of Revision
that would have given the judiciary a joint role in exercising veto power with the
executive.116

Also, as a textual and structural matter, we know that the Framers

approved the placement of certain categories of power belonging to one branch in another
branch (for example, the Senate enjoys a judicial power, to try impeachment;117 the
President enjoys legislative power, to return a bill and to recommend legislation to
Congress118). Yet nowhere in Article III or elsewhere do the Framers give any legislative
or executive power to the judiciary (a structural choice further reflected in the
Convention’s rejection of the Council of Revision).
An approach grounded in a robust political question doctrine is also sensible
especially when we think about the nature of federative power theory. Locke based the
federative power upon the kind of authority man had in the state of nature; whereas law
could direct the exercise of executive power, federative power was not amenable to such
directives, but rather relied upon the exercise of prudence and discretion119 (a notion
reaffirmed by Publius and Pacificus). As the Hamdan decision foreshadows, judicial
efforts to police such prudence and discretion will invariably involve the courts’ own
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independent judgments about the normative propriety or acceptability of political action.
This is not a judgment for politically independent courts.
But beyond these doctrinal constraints, and the problem of competence that I, too,
find persuasive as a reason for robust doctrines that keep judicial review from doing
mischief, I advocate normative limitations on judicial review grounded in a
constitutionalist conception of institutional structure and responsibility. My contention is
that the judicialization of federative power – by which I mean a model of judicial review
that strictly and aggressively scrutinizes the constitutional allocation of federative power
or a particular exercise of federative power – undermines the constitutional scheme for
making, enforcing, and restraining American foreign policy. These arrangements are
preferable to judicial review because they respect the forms of the Constitution, more
consistent with the institutional structures that the Constitution envisions for the exercise
of federative power. In this sense, it is disconcerting that Justice Thomas has so often
spoken only for himself on this matter.
Unfortunately, Americans have grown accustomed to resolving essentially
political disputes in the courts, and the courts have only encouraged this phenomenon, so
much so that today the Supreme Court is viewed as yet another political body, existing to
satisfy the immediate appetites of a demanding public.120 As The Deconstitutionalization
of America explains, “the conviction that judicial actors are also political actors can have
undesirable effects on the behavior of citizens.”121 Thus, what emerges is a litigation
culture that perpetually seeks out the judiciary for relief from disagreeable policies,
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bypassing the complexity that accompanies coalitional politics and day-to-day
policymaking.122 War and foreign affairs cases for most of our history have proven to be
the exception; no areas of law and public policy have provoked such ready employment
of the doctrines of justiciability, or other moments of judicial deference, as war and
foreign affairs.

Thoughtful scholars like Professor Franck and Dean Koh have

disparagingly described this history as “judicial abdication” or “judicial tolerance;”123 I
prefer to think of it as prudent circumspection, a virtuous trait for a limited and
independent judiciary. But perhaps the war on terror cases foreshadow a change. I am
reluctant to overstate the case: it is important to understand that none of these cases were
cases about the separation of powers in any direct sense, and their holdings did not
concern directly the constitutional allocation of federative power. They are, admittedly,
imperfect symbols of a shifting approach. Still, the aggressiveness of the Court’s review,
and of its rebuke of the President’s asserted constitutional role, presents an ominous sign.
The contemporary Supreme Court is all about courts.

Far from prudently

circumspect, this Court possesses an imperial understanding of its own role in the
constitutional scheme (provoked by a citizenry that has been asking more and more of the
federal government for some 60 years now). It assumes its competence (indeed, its
superior judgment) in virtually all areas of political life, in ways that, as I have argued in
a recent article concerning the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, signify a kind of
judicial omnipotence and omniscience.124
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This is evident in the Court’s death penalty cases, like Atkins v. Virginia125 and
Roper v. Simmons,126 where the Court constitutionalized the superiority of its moral and
political views on capital punishment by holding that the Eighth Amendment
contemplated that “in the end, our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty. . . . ”127 It is also evident in the Court’s recent
political gerrymandering cases. Although four justices have clearly articulated a sound
basis for applying the political question doctrine to claims of political gerrymandering, a
majority of the Court simply is not prepared to relinquish its power to supervise
perceived political inequities in the drawing of legislative districts. 128
Modesty, as Judge Posner notes, is not the order of the day in this Supreme
Court.129 The war on terror cases, and the Hamdan case in particular, also suggest that
judicial modesty will not prevail in cases involving war-time political decision-making,
either.
The difficulty, however, goes beyond the mere unseemliness of the Court’s
arrogance. Aggressive judicial review of cases that implicate the allocation and exercise
of federative power undermines not just the institutional role of the Court, but of our
political institutions, as well.

As I have previously argued, in this emerging regime,

courts, rather than political institutions, become primary mediating institutions for
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filtering out and moderating public passions and factious spirit.130 This kind of regime
minimizes essential distance between governing institutions and the people.

This

distance, which the Constitution contemplates and makes real in its description of our
institutions, provides the space that institutions need to fulfill their responsibilities
(especially their most grave ones), space between the chaotic, often undisciplined cries of
public opinion and the measured refinement of popular will through reason, rational
deliberation and sober judgment.131 Leaders of the founding generation like Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall, believed that courts should be cognizant of the demands of
practical governance in a republic, allowing the political departments to function free of
an imprudent judiciary.132 Thus, the distance the Constitution provides for the executive
is substantial (though modern practice has intolerably diminished it, too); the distance
provided, indeed, mandated, for the judiciary is even greater, and is necessary to preserve
not just the independence of the courts, but their circumspection, as well. Montesquieu
and Publius both remind us that political liberty requires that judicial power be separate
from the political powers vested in legislature and executive.133 By the same token, a
regime of omnipotent judicial review also makes practical governance and the object of
controlling the governed even more burdensome.
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Judicializing federative power diminishes the significance of the Constitution’s
commitment of competing foreign affairs powers to the political branches, the allocation
of which Professor Yoo persuasively demonstrates in his recent scholarship.134 As I have
argued elsewhere, constitutional deliberation should be encouraged in the political
branches, each of which possesses an independent obligation to determine the
Constitution’s meaning.135

The political branches will be less likely to deliberate

seriously about their respective constitutional roles when there exists the prospect of
judicial relief and guidance from the courts. And particularly in circumstances where (as
is usually the case) it is the President whose assertion of power is challenged, aggressive
judicial review will also undermine the significance of the Constitution’s provision for
political self-help.

Congress possess three important checks on presidential

overreaching: its power to fund foreign relations projects, its power to legislate (which
includes investigative and oversight powers), and, often forgotten, its impeachment
power.136 It can employ those checks without a permission slip from the courts.
One response may be that cases like Hamdan do not actually undermine political
institutions, but empower them, at least to the extent that the decisions often inure to
Congress’s benefit, a la The Steel Seizure Case.

But this argument overlooks the

constitutional damage done to the Presidency. Judicializing federative power, even when
(in fact, particularly when) it rebukes executive exercise of that power on constitutional
grounds, will make the executive more cautious, more ambivalent, in Professor
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Mansfield’s terms.137 It will deprive the executive of the energy that Publius reminded us
is vital to its effectiveness.138
Moreover, specific affirmative constitutional grants of power to the President are
compromised, which are necessary for effectuating the President’s federative powers: the
Vesting Clause and the Commander-in-Chief Clause are principal casualties,139 but one
must not overlook the significance, too, of the Oath Clause.140 The constitutional Oath
operates as an affirmative grant of power to the President to defend the Constitution. To
be sure, other officers must also take an oath, but their oaths are not constitutionally
prescribed and the Constitution says only that they must “support this Constitution.”141
As a textual and structural matter, then, there is something significant about the fact that
the President’s oath is placed in the Constitution and that it requires him to “preserve,
protect, and defend” the Constitution, rather than merely “support” it. The oath provides
a mechanism and a source of legitimacy for the exertion of the President’s energy to
137
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safeguard the Republic, energy that is not just defensive in its nature and that, in the end,
ought to promote civic virtue and decency.142
In a regime where a unitary executive’s effort to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution is subject to intense scrutiny by the courts, the president must constantly
look over his shoulder for five disapproving Supreme Court justices (the prospect of
which may be more daunting than 535 disapproving members of the House and Senate).
Of course, this is true with any presidential action; but, again, the Constitution divides
federative power between the political branches (note, it divides independent powers;
each power is not “shared,” but rests solely in the branch to which it is given, to resist
encroachment) in ways that it does not divide other categories of power – the distribution
of federative power to multiple branches is unique in our constitutional scheme – which
reflects the constitutional and political distinction between domestic action and foreign
affairs, where the consequences of lacking energy are more dire. The very characteristics
that define the energetic executive are of special import in the domain of foreign affairs,
where the president must be able to act with dispatch and secrecy.143 A judicialized
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federative power like the one that Hamdan portends, however, has the potential to
relegate the Commander-in-Chief to service at the pleasure of the courts. Unity and
energy are thereafter marginalized to the point of meaninglessness. Judicial fingerwagging at the President (of the kind we see in Hamdi and Hamdan) may seem appealing
and useful at a time when the President and his foreign policy are unpopular. But it can
do lasting damage to the institution and, thus, to the republic.
It is in the executive that the Constitution best balances stability and adaptability
and best reflects the Lockean vision of federative power. Professor Mansfield correctly
explains that our system constitutionalizes necessity in the manner of Locke.144 Accident
and force cannot be removed from human affairs.145 The Constitution’s genius lies, in
part, in its capacity to constitute an institution that may (must) grapple with necessity,
while still retaining the republican form. Both Publius and Pacificus remind us that
energy is not a recipe for prerogative;146 rather, it is a kind of Aristotelian mean between
weakness and unrestrained prerogative. Nor is energy in the executive incompatible with
safe government.147 In this sense, at least, we can see once again how the Constitution’s
prescription for federative power is more Lockean than its surface allocations would
suggest.
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Another response may be that an absence of judicial oversight will weaken
Congress, so much so as to make its federative powers meaningless, or, as Justice
O’Connor seemed concerned in Hamdi, judicial deference would effectively place
federative powers solely within a single branch. But why must this be so?
This argument assumes that Congress needs the prospect of judicial relief to
defend its own constitutional powers. But as I have explained already, those powers exist
independently of any judicial bolstering; lacking the political will or fortitude to employ
them is not the same as not having them in the first place.148 This argument also
assumes, again wrongly I think, that federative power is a kind of zero-sum game, where
we must choose between a weak Congress and a strong executive, or a weak executive
and a strong Congress. By implementing a design where the political branches are
empowered to struggle with one another and deliberate seriously about the exercise of
American military and diplomatic authority, the Constitution contemplates that we can
have a strong Congress and a strong executive in foreign affairs. It contemplates that
ambition will be made to counteract ambition.149 If the Framers had meant to adopt a
purely and formally Lockean version of federative power, they would not have given
Congress the constitutional tools to safeguard its own prerogatives in war and foreign
policy. The War Powers Resolution is the modern Congress’s most dominant assertion
of its prerogatives. Moreover, it is particularly notable that the 110th Congress has taken
action to further undermine the notion that the Republic’s dominant branch needs the
support of the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives in the area of federative
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power.

Multiple bills and non-binding resolutions have been introduced to limits

President Bush’s efforts to send more military troops to Iraq in an effort to stem the tide
of violence there and better enable Iraqi forces to secure their communities.150 The
Senate Judiciary Committee also held a hearing to explore the nature and scope of its war
powers.151 Whether these actions eventually result in binding legal authority, or produce
an actual conflict with the Executive, or are even politically or constitutionally desirable,
is another matter entirely. They reflect at the very least an institutional interest in
(indeed, a capacity for) asserting legislative prerogatives in the war powers arena, further
ratifying the wisdom that the Constitution contemplates conflict and competition between
the political branches free from a judicialized federative power.
Consequently, judicialization does damage to both the Lockean and un-Lockean
forms of the constitutional structure.

IV. CONCLUSION

Those who argue that the second President Bush has asserted an unprecedented
view of executive authority overlook much history, and its lessons. Our political and
constitutional history is littered, both in theory and in practice, with competing arguments
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about the scope of presidential powers. And some of our most beloved Presidents were
ones who took particularly robust views of their Article II authority, despite the
unpopularity of their actions or claims that they had acted without precedent. This is not
to justify any particular foreign policy decision by the current President or any other
occupant of the Office. It is, rather, to suggest that his view of presidential power would
not have been unfamiliar to other Presidents who faced national emergencies and grave
threats in the international system; those “tides” in the “affairs of men” of which Jay
speaks in Federalist #64. That a politically-friendly Congress has, as some feel, failed to
assert its own prerogatives is hardly the fault of the President, and, to be sure, the
President’s assertion of his own prerogatives does not become “extraordinary” or
“unprecedented” merely because the counterexample is a Congress that either agrees with
the President or, as in some historical instances, still in search of a spine donor.
But in order to meaningfully employ a scheme in which congressional and
executive federative powers are simultaneously robust but not encroaching, we must,
rather than seek solace from the courts, take seriously the formal institutional
arrangements that the Constitution provides. The forms of the Constitution help us secure
competent government, safe government. When we value the convenience of judicial
bypass above form, it often becomes easier for one branch to encroach, or to at least
justify the encroachment, something about which the Framers were primarily concerned.
Distance was, for them, a structural virtue. Over time, the offended branch becomes too
weak to defend its constitutional prerogatives. When we rely upon the forms of the
Constitution, however, we see a scheme for the robust exercise of constitutional
prerogatives by the political branches that also resists, or at least checks, encroachments.
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That scheme is particularly dynamic in the field of federative power. Judicializing
federative power, however, undermines the formal constitutional design and, ultimately,
marginalizes political authority to address and respond to the harsh realities and
necessities that accompany the conduct of actors in the international arena.
Circumscribing judicial review of the political branches, and particularly a Lockean
executive, may seem dangerous. It is – but so is an omnipotent judiciary . . . perhaps
moreso.
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